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Since the 1990s, Islamic fundamentalism in 
Bangladesh has been rising, not only in the 
parliamentary and political-administrative 
spheres, but also outside the institutional 
structure in the form of the emergence of 
militant outfits. Therefore, one can state that 
the Islamists are following a twofold 
strategy: First, trying to undermine the 
political system from within by using the 
opportunities offered in a democratic form of 
governance, which can be described as the 
formal ‘political front’ of the fundamentalist 
movement. Second, the building up of an 
informal, extra-constitutional ‘militant front’. 
This finds its expression in the use of 
physical violence, armed confrontation, and 
other extra-judicial measures. Both 
strategies – political and militant – are 
aimed at achieving the core fundamentalist 
goal of establishing an Islamic state based 
on a narrow interpretation of Islam. One has 
to be aware, that this includes the 
elimination of democracy, the rejection of 
secularism, human rights, and especially 
women’s rights in Bangladesh. Due to close 
linkages with Islamist terrorist organizations 
like the Taliban it is becoming more obvious 
that the Islamists in Bangladesh are 
increasingly applying the same tactics its 
peers use in Afghanistan in order to gain 
power.  
 
In assessing the performance of the 
Islamists, one must state that they have 
made worrying progress. Due to a political 
alliance with the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party (BNP), Islamist political front 
organizations became a part of the 
government and entrenched themselves in 
party politics as well as in key positions of 
the institutional structure. Regarding the 
militant front: The presence of Islamist 
parties in the political power structure, 
especially their anti-Indian, pro-Pakistan, 
and pro-Islamic policy, provide a convenient 
atmosphere for the growth of Islamic 
militancy. Furthermore, due to political 
patronage, especially the granting of 
impunity, militants felt increasingly 
encouraged to carry out their ‘Islamisation’ 
campaign by violent means. Especially in 
the rural areas this is gaining significance. 
In the earlier years it was common 
understanding that Islamic propaganda and 
action were confined to urban centre’s, 
because people on the country side were 
more concerned with the daily life 
challenges than supporting religious 
fundamentalism. However, this argument 
must be questioned due to the increasing 
activities of the militant groups in rural 
areas. The following reasons must be 
mentioned: It is naïve to state, that 
unfortunate socio-economic conditions 
automatically lead to a disinterest towards 
religious fanaticism amongst the rural 
population. There is evidence from an 
international perspective, that especially 
because of the deterioration of living 
conditions, people are successfully targeted 
by Islamist recruiting patterns. Furthermore, 
due to the use of force combined with the 
patronage from local authorities, people in 
remote areas lack sufficient protection 
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against militant Islamists' campaigns and 
are forced to accept their influence and to 
follow their fundamentalist directives. 
Consequently, religious fundamentalists, 
due to support from Islamists and Islamists-
friendly political parties, gained significant 
leverage not only over vast parts of the 
country, but also over large sections of the 
society, urban as well as rural. Additionally, 
the Islamist movement was able to build 
firm bridgeheads in all governmental 
departments and the societal institutional 
structure. In brief, the fundamentalists are 
developing a strong countrywide network to 
gain and maintain power in order to carry 
out an Islamist revolution. 
 
In this context, one must state that 
Bangladesh Islamists are not only a firm 
and integrated part of a international 
terrorist network, but also a pivot of terror 
serving as an additional as well as 
alternative resource and coordination base, 
providing man power, training facilities, 
hideouts, and logistics. Even more, 
Bangladesh is increasingly functioning as a 
plexus between South East Asia, South 
Asia, and Central Asia, from Thailand to 
Afghanistan. Here one can state that there 
is correlation between the resurgence and 
re-strengthening of militant Islamist forces in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh. 
Osama bin Laden’s well-known declaration 
in 1998 that called for an coordinated 
international Jihad, did not only heave al-
Qaida, the Taliban and other groups into the 
larger picture but also made Bangladeshi 
Islamist groups and organisations part of 
global jihad.  
 
In consequence, over the last years violent 
attacks by Islamists have been rising. But 
also in qualitative terms the threat scenario 
posed by militants is growing exponentially 
in Bangladesh. This finds its expression in 
more aggressive forms of fundamentalism. 
They have targeted ‘recalcitrant’ politicians, 
academics, journalists and bloggers, 
members of the judiciary, religious 
minorities, especially Buddhist, Hindus and 
Christians. Also moderate Muslims, who do 
not adhere to the extremist doctrines, are 
considered to be not Islamic (enough) and 
as such are labelled ‘infidels’ and 
subsequently-considered to be fair game. It 
is important to note, that the Islamists are 
not only fighting against members of certain 
religious minorities, or Islamic sects whom 
they view as un-Islamic (e.g. Ahmadiyya): 
the actions make it clear that Islamists want 
to eliminate everything which is related with 
these groups. In other words, they don’t 
only fight the followers of certain religious 
communities but their belief systems as 
well: burning Holy Scriptures and other texts 
of religious significance, destroying houses 
of worship and respective educational 
institutions and socio-economic 
development facilities. Furthermore, since 
religion is very much intermingled with local 
traditions, habits and customs, as well as 
going along ethnic lines, Islamists are also 
destroying regionally orientated cultural 
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patterns, values and goods, like 
Bangladesh’s syncretistic folk tradition. 
Since regional cultural-religious elements 
underpin plurality and tolerance in Muslim 
societies they are perceived as a threat 
towards the pan-Islamic world view of 
Islamists. It is a large threat to the 
omnipotence of the sole and narrow 
interpretation of Islam extremist elements 
adhere to. Therefore, Islamic 
fundamentalism is the most dangerous 
challenge not only towards the existence 
but also for the values Bangladesh stands 
for: democracy, secularism, and tolerance.  
 
Instead of being a model for other countries 
with Muslim majority populations regarding 
the implementation of a democratic and 
secular form of governance, Bangladesh is 
dangerously close to turning into an 
autocratic, Islamic fundamentalist state. 
This is surprising since the majority of the 
Bangladeshis are committed to democratic 
order and secularism. Despite all the 
political turmoil, surveys confirm that a 
democratic regime is the most preferable 
form of government in Bangladesh. For 
example, IDEA’s 2008 edition of the “State 
of Democracy in South Asia” points out that 
69 per cent of the people are support 
democracy. Nevertheless, it seems that the 
political landscape in Bangladesh has 
changed to such an extent that even 
politicians and political parties, known as 
spearheads of secular and democratic 
principles, ignore the creeping Islamic 
takeover. This marks a trend which is 
diametric opposite to the long moderate 
tradition of Islam in Bangladesh.  
 
Therefore, one has to raise the question 
how this could happen. Why could 
Bangladesh transform from a state which 
perceived itself as deeply committed to 
secularism and tolerance, and as such the 
forefront of democratic transition in the 
Islamic world, to just another state which 
has to suffer from the choke of Islamic 
bigotry and fanaticism? In other words, why 
does the Bangladeshi state accept the 
deconstruction of its foundational identity, 
political-administrative system, and the 
terrorizing of its society? Needless to say, 
such a complex puzzle will be not solved 
easily, but a matrix of causalities can be 
identified. In general, the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Bangladesh is 
determined by endogenous (domestic) and 
exogenous (international) elements. Both 
streams of factors led to a troubled and 
tragic political scenario which enabled the 
existence of a breeding ground for religious 
fanaticism. Regarding the domestic 
dimension following reasons are 
predominantly responsible: To begin with, 
there is an unfortunate political culture 
which is determined by extraordinary 
polarisation, hostility, and politics of revenge 
between the two major political parties. By 
experiencing this, political actors see 
democracy as a zero-sum game marked by 
a destructive ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy in order to 
achieve partisan objectives which are 
prioritized over national concerns. In this 
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context, not only political institutions and 
society are highly politicised but also the 
whole governmental machinery. 
Appointments in politics and administration 
are based more on loyalty, obedience, 
obeisance, charisma, and kinship, rather 
than on performance, merits, and skills. As 
a result, many of the state agencies remain 
ineffective or absent in rural/remote areas 
which is yet just another nail in the coffin of 
already poor and stagnating governance. 
This has also enabled endemic corruption 
to spread like a wildfire. In addition to that, 
the undemocratic nature, unprofessional 
practice and behaviour of political parties 
contribute to the semblance of instability as 
well. Political parties possess a weak 
organizational structure, lack internal 
democracy and a code of ethics. They 
suffer from a high degree of intra-party 
factional feuds leading to numerous fissions 
(and fusions) in the past. Excessive 
personal leadership cult, dynastic rule, 
patron clientelism, as well as politics of 
patronage constitute other negative traits of 
the country’s polity. At the same time, 
criminalization of politics, coercion as an 
acceptable mode of governance and 
widespread use of violence are punctuating 
the political landscape negatively. 
Subsequently politicians, rely on 
musclemen (mastaans/goondas) to achieve 
goals in an unrestricted struggle for power. 
Another important feature of Bangladesh’s 
uncertain political climate is the tense civil-
military relationship which led to indirect 
militarization of politics and direct military 
rule. Therefore, it does not come as a 
surprise that there is a lack of confidence of 
the people in the political leadership which 
implemented a highly centralized and 
personalised decision-making style 
extending the power distance between 
politicians and general public. The latter is 
just seen as an instrument to outbid the 
political enemy. This is gaining significance, 
since there is also no constructive working 
relationship between the government and 
opposition. In result, the parliament as the 
place for political debate to deal with issues 
concerning the opposition and the people 
(which are already hampered by low social 
capital and education/literacy) is paralysed 
and/or side-lined. Instead, in order to 
ventilate grievances, politics is moved 
towards the streets, especially by calling 
‘hartals’ (general strikes) with detrimental 
ramifications for the already deteriorating 
socio-economic conditions. In addition to 
these internal factors, external ones were 
crucial for the growth of the Islamists as 
well. One of the most significant roles is 
played by Saudi Arabia, especially by its 
financial support and other economic 
benefits. like for (Sunni) Islamists, the 
Iranian revolution as inspiration for a global 
Islamist movement (mostly for the Shia 
stream), the defeat of the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan, the emergence of the Taliban 
movement and other international militant 
groups (including the supportive role of 
Pakistan), and, last but not least, the 
troubled relations of Bangladesh with India 
and Myanmar/Burma, as well as the ‘proxy-
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war’ between Pakistan and India. 
 
To sum up, besides all these determinants 
which prepared the inroad for the Islamists 
into the political and social system of 
Bangladesh, there are also still indications 
of the general desire and political will of 
secular forces to stop this process of 
transforming the county into an Islamic 
fundamentalist state. But there is no doubt 
that the influence over state and society of 
Islamists is growing and the quality of 
democracy especially the respect of human 
rights is in a spiral decline. However, 
Bangladesh showed in the past that it is 
possible to form larger alliances. For 
example the massive political upheavals in 
1990 or in 2006/2007, despite deep 
polarisation of society, the Bangladesh 
people and all kinds of civil society 
organisations, forced the political parties’ 
leadership to build a national consensus 
and to form an alliance against military rule. 
Also today, there is a need for such a 
national consensus in order not only to 
bounce back from Islamic fundamentalism 
but also to eradicate it from Bangladesh. 
 
